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NOTE
OVERCOMING THE ACHILLES’
HEEL OF CONSUMER PROTECTION:
LIMITING MANDATORY ARBITRATION
CLAUSES IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many lawsuits are “doomed” irrespective of their merits.1 These
lawsuits may neither contain frivolous claims nor lack vital evidence.2
Instead, they are precluded from judicial remedy because they arise
out of contracts containing arbitration clauses.3 Aware of it or not,
most Americans are bound by “several, if not dozens, of forced
arbitration clauses.”4
Forced arbitration clauses are prevalent in “hundreds of millions of
consumer contracts”;5 yet, consumers are generally unaware of the
presence of these clauses.6 Mandatory arbitration clauses are often
1. David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy,
101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1218 (2013).
2. Id. at 1219; Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 270
(2015).
3. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 681 (1996) [hereinafter Sternlight,
Panacea or Corporate Tool?]. American courts have generally enforced arbitration clauses and
consequently, many consumers are required to arbitrate their claims. See Jean R. Sternlight, Is the
U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment
Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 835-37 (2002) [hereinafter
Sternlight, Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to
that of the Rest of the World].
4. MARTHA MCCLUSKEY ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, REGULATING FORCED
ARBITRATION IN CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES: RE-OPENING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS TO
VICTIMIZED CONSUMERS 1 (2016), http://progressivereform.org/articles/Forced_Arbitration_Paper_
050416.pdf.
5. See Mandy Walker, The Consumer Rights You’re Giving Away, CONSUMER REP., Nov.
2015, at 8.
6. See Arbitration Clauses Harm Consumers, GOLDMAN SCARLATO PENNY P.C.,
http://www.lawgsp.com/arbitration-clauses-harm-consumers (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (reporting
that a study conducted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) “found that more
than 75% of the consumers surveyed did not realize that they signed agreements containing
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hidden within the fine print of terms for leases, and insurance, credit
card, employment, and nursing home agreements.7 By simply signing a
contract containing an arbitration clause or “clicking ‘I agree’ on a
website,” a consumer may be instantly bound to take any dispute arising
from that contract to arbitration.8
Arbitration is a contractual method of resolving disputes in which
parties select an impartial person, called an arbitrator, to render a
decision.9 The decision of the arbitrator(s) is referred to as an award.10
Provided that a valid arbitration agreement exists and the dispute in
question falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement, parties may
be required to arbitrate their claims.11
Arbitration often leads to speedier resolution of disputes compared
to typical court proceedings because arbitration requires fewer
formalities and the decision makers are often selected based upon their
technical expertise or knowledge.12 Moreover, the fast-paced process of
arbitration may minimize costs of dispute resolution and hostility
between families and businesses in conflict.13 In addition, arbitration
may provide more privacy for parties than a public hearing since
arbitration may be subject to non-disclosure agreements.14
arbitration clauses”).
7. Walker, supra note 5, at 8; see, e.g., CFPB Study Finds that Arbitration Agreements
Limit Relief for Consumers, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Mar. 10, 2015),
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-that-arbitration-agreements-limitrelief-for-consumers (“For example, in the credit card market, card issuers representing more than
half of all credit card debt have arbitration clauses – impacting as many as 80 million consumers.”).
The author of this Note acknowledges that in more than 400 credit card contracts, consumers are
afforded the opportunity to opt out of mandatory arbitration. Megan Leonhardt, Credit Card
Companies Want You to Give Up Your Right to Sue Them. Here’s How to Opt Out, MONEY (Nov.
14, 2016), http://time.com/money/4556422/opt-out-arbitration-citi-credit-card. However, the short
period of time to opt out is effectually inadequate because consumers are either unaware of their
ability to opt out of mandatory arbitration, or miss the short period of time to opt out. Id.
8. Walker, supra note 5, at 8.
9. KEITH V. NOVICK & WILLIAM WHITEHILL, PROBATE, TRS. & ESTATES SECTION, DALLAS
BAR ASS’N, KING SOLOMON’S OTHER ALTERNATIVE: ARBITRATION IN THE TRUST & ESTATES
PRACTICE 1 (2013), http://www.dallasbar.org/sites/default/files/arbitration_in_the_trust_and_
estates_practice_0_0.pdf; Consumer Legal Information, OKLA. B. ASS’N, http://www.okbar.org/
public/brochures/methodsforresolvingconflictsanddisputes.aspx (last modified Aug. 2015).
10. NOVICK & WHITEHILL, supra note 9, at 1.
11. Id.
12. See SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ARBITRATION COMM., A.B.A.,
BENEFITS OF ARBITRATION FOR COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 3-6, https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/events/dispute_resolution/committees/arbitration/arbitrationguide.authcheckdam.pdf (last
visited Nov. 15, 2017).
13. See NOVICK & WHITEHILL, supra note 9, at 2.
14. See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV.
1211, 1218, 1222 (2006); see also LINDQUIST & VENNUM PLLP & ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL,
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However, certain disadvantages of arbitration may follow from the
less formal procedures.15 For example, the right to discovery or the right
of appeal may be limited—or even completely restricted—depending on
the exact terms of the contract.16 Moreover, claimants may be further
disadvantaged if they are forced to relinquish their right to a trial by
jury.17 Unlike juries who often sympathize with claimants or judges who
rely upon law and rules of evidence to make decisions, arbitrators may
issue awards based upon broad and nebulous principles of justice,
equity, and compromise.18 Unless parties specify otherwise in the
contract, arbitrators are generally not bound to follow legal precedent.19
Furthermore, arbitration may require more time and resources than
anticipated since the proceedings may become very lengthy, depending
on the complexity of issues at hand.20 In the context of arbitration
between consumers and commercial parties, the commercial party
usually has the upper hand.21 The commercial party typically selects

SAMPLE ARBITRATION CLAUSES WITH COMMENTS, http://www.acc.com/_cs_upload/vl/
membersonly/SampleFormPolicy/409703_1.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (“A confidentiality
agreement in the agreement to arbitrate will preserve confidentiality, a significant benefit of the
arbitration process for those companies that prefer not to have their business disputes made
public.”).
15. See JOHN W. COOLEY & STEVEN LUBET, NITA PRACTICAL GUIDE SERIES: ARBITRATION
ADVOCACY 6-7 (2d ed. 2003).
16. Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process Is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 281, 283 (2002). Since arbitration need not follow the rules of evidence, any relevant
information with probative value may potentially enter as evidence. See KARL BAYER & VICTORIA
VANBUREN, EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY IN ARBITRATION ch. 18, at 19, in 23RD ANNUAL
ADVANCED EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY COURSE (2010).
17. See Stacey P. Slaughter & Denise Rahne, Arbitration vs. Jury Trials: Does It Make
a Difference?, INSIDE COUNS. (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.law.com/insidecounsel/2014/12/02/
arbitration-vs-jury-trials-does-it-make-a-differen/?slreturn=20171001140644 (noting that arbitrators
typically base their decisions on logic while juries determine cases based upon notions of
fundamental fairness).
18. NOVICK & WHITEHILL, supra note 9, at 2-3; Slaughter & Rahne, supra note 17.
19. See Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 310
(1995).
20. NOVICK & WHITEHILL, supra note 9, at 1; see Daniel E. González et al., Controlling
the Rising Costs of Arbitration, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Oct. 2014), https://www.financier
worldwide.com/controlling-the-rising-costs-of-arbitration/#.WHptejsg9Ps (showing that costs of
arbitration may increase dramatically depending on the number of expert witnesses, expenses for
travel and accommodation of witnesses, and other logistical costs necessary, “such as necessary
translation services, interpreter services, court reporter services, videographer services, rental fees
for hearing rooms, food and beverage consumed during the hearings, photocopying and courier
services, among others”).
21. See Walker, supra note 5, at 8.
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the arbitrator based upon the arbitrator’s previous and often
favorable decisions.22
This Note begins by analyzing the historical background of
arbitration, including why it exists and its purposes, as well as the
current state of the law.23 It then examines the actions taken by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to monitor
arbitration.24 Part III discusses the legal issues and public policy
concerns created by the use of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
clauses.25 Part IV argues that pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses
in consumer contracts should be prohibited as intended by the drafters of
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), and as other countries have already
done.26 Alternatively, Part IV proposes model legislation that would
regulate the use of mandatory arbitration clauses.27
II. HISTORY OF ARBITRATION IN AMERICA
It is well settled that “[t]he United States inherited arbitration from
England.”28 This Part discusses the origins of arbitration in England, its
transition into the American judiciary, and the current state of arbitration
in the United States.29 This Part also discusses the development of the
CFPB and the Bureau’s current state.30

22. See David Lazarus, Forced Arbitrations Fail to Resolve Disputes Fairly, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2015, at C1 (“A 2007 report by Public Citizen found that over a four-year period,
arbitrators ruled in favor of banks and credit card companies 94% of the time in disputes with
California consumers.”); Liz Kramer, Beyond the Headlines Part II: What the New CFPB
Report Teaches Us About Arbitration v. Litigation, ARB. NATION (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://arbitrationnation.com/beyond-the-headlines-part-ii-what-the-new-cfpb-report-teaches-usabout-arbitration-v-litigation (stating that the CFPB’s March 2015 study found that the arbitrators
favored the consumer in only twenty percent of disputes and that consumers were only awarded an
average of fifty-seven cents for every dollar claimed). Businesses may typically select an arbitrator
based upon the arbitrators’ skills, expertise, and previous decisions. See NOVICK & WHITEHILL,
supra note 9, at 2; Walker, supra note 5, at 8.
23. See infra Part II.A–B.
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part IV.A.
27. See infra Part IV.B.
28. RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT 5 (1997); see also Drew M. Gulley, That Enhanced Arbitration Appeal Amendment:
A Proposal to Save American Jurisprudence from Arbitration, Modeled on the English Arbitration
Act of 1996, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1098-99 (2008).
29. See infra Part II.A–B.
30. See infra Part II.C.
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A. Development of Arbitration in England
Before the codification of laws or establishment of courts, English
merchants resorted to arbitration in order to resolve disputes.31 However,
even after the establishment of the Royal Courts, merchants continued to
resort to outside adjudication that better served their needs.32 As early as
the medieval period, trading communities relied on special tribunals to
resolve disputes arising from local and international trade.33 To ensure
the ability to arbitrate, commercial parties drafted their charters in order
to permit dispute resolution in these special tribunals.34 As their purpose
was to expedite the resolution of disputes, these tribunals were the
predecessors of modern arbitral tribunals.35
Despite widespread use of arbitration tribunals, courts remained
hostile to arbitration and did not readily enforce arbitration awards.36
However, arbitration remained prevalent because arbitrators could
potentially resolve disputes more quickly than judges due to their
31. See Frank D. Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice and Law, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
155, 155 (1970) (stating that one of the earliest recorded arbitrators was King Solomon in the Old
Testament). The history of arbitration procedures in medieval England remains largely unwritten, as
the development of English common law has overshadowed the development of other forms of
dispute resolution. Edward Powell, Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century
England, 2 LAW & HIST. REV. 21, 21 (1984).
32. 14 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 187 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G.
Hanbury eds., 1964); William Catron Jones, History of Commercial Arbitration in England and the
United States: A Summary View, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION: A ROAD TO WORLDWIDE COOPERATION 129-30 (Martin Domke ed., 1958). The Royal Courts were not adapted to serve
the needs of merchants since the Royal Courts lacked the necessary expediency for transient
merchants and were more concerned with the disputes over land and conduct that were detrimental
to the King’s peace. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC
L. REV. 449, 459-60 (1996); see JOHN F. PHILLIPS, ARBITRATION, LAW PRACTICE AND PRECEDENTS
9-10 (1988).
33. KYRIAKI NOUSSIA, CONFIDENTIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POSITION UNDER ENGLISH, US, GERMAN AND FRENCH LAW 11
(2010).
34. Id. at 12.
35. Id.
36. Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory
Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 793-94 (2002).
Arbitration awards were generally unenforceable because Royal Courts desired to maintain
authority over legal disputes. Id. Slowly, the Royal Courts began to offer more protection for
arbitration agreements and awards. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 32, at 196-97. For instance,
in 1746, an arbitration clause was struck down by the Royal Court because the enforcement would
“oust courts of their jurisdiction.” Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern
Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
479, 483 (1995) (quoting Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129 (1746)). However, concerns over jurisdiction
were likely motivated by financial concerns because Kings generated revenue from the intervening
judicial activity. Id.
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expertise in commercial and technical matters.37 Since traditional
arbitration could be revoked any time before the award was determined,
parties would often revoke the arbitrator’s authority when an
unfavorable decision was suspected.38 In response to this abuse, England
was compelled to enact the Arbitration Act of 1889 in order to make
arbitration agreements irrevocable except by leave of the court;
consequently, the framework for modern arbitration in the United States
was established.39
B. Rise of Commercial Arbitration in the United States
Arbitration in the United States traces back to the early colonial
period.40 It was commonly used to resolve disputes between merchants
and businessmen of different colonies because arbitration was more
efficient and effective than courts during this time period.41 However,
the ability of arbitrators to produce fair results was questioned in the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.42
The rise of commercial arbitration grew out of the enthusiasm for a
free market during the Roaring Twenties.43 Following the end of World
War I, the economy in the United States was transformed by the shift
from wartime to peacetime production.44 Consumerism dominated the
1920s as technology advanced in areas such as automobiles, household
appliances, and other mass-produced products.45 The extraordinary
destruction of World War I along with the consumerism of the 1920s
facilitated the development of modern arbitration laws in America.46
Arbitration laws “reflected a societal desire to avoid future mass
destruction and the belief that peaceful resolution of economic rivalries
37. NOUSSIA, supra note 33, at 12.
38. Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States,
12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 245 (1928).
39. See id. at 246.
40. See BALES, supra note 28, at 5; Benson, supra note 36, at 481-83.
41. Benson, supra note 36, at 481-83.
42. See Jones, supra note 38, at 245-46.
43. Jeff Bleich & Josh Patashnik, Arbitration’s Empire, S.F. ATT’Y, Spring 2016, at 36.
The rise of mass production along with expansion of the consumer goods markets led to the
economic expansion of the Roaring Twenties. THOMAS STREIGSSGUTH, THE ROARING TWENTIES
276 (rev. ed. 2007).
44. Nate Sullivan, American Economy in the 1920s: Consumerism, Stock Market & Economic
Shift, STUDY.COM, http://study.com/academy/lesson/american-economy-in-the-1920s-consumerismstock-market-economic-shift.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
45. Id.
46. IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION
LAWS IN AMERICA 163-65 (2013).
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could assist to avoid future wars.”47 Statutory reforms, beginning in New
York, radically changed the enforceability of arbitration agreements.48
Prior to 1920, arbitration agreements were very difficult to enforce
in New York.49 However, 1920 marked the year that New York adopted
its first arbitration law, “revers[ing] the common-law rule of revocability
of arbitration agreements.”50 The drafters of the New York law used its
success to lobby Congress for a federal law that would similarly make
arbitration agreements between merchants enforceable in federal court.51
The underlying purpose behind the federal law was to ensure that New
Yorkers could compel out-of-staters to arbitrate claims.52 However, a
federal law would have other purposes including the following: (1) to
reduce consumer costs; (2) to reduce court delays; (3) to save time and

47. Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of History,
2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 137-38. Many intellectuals and artists were shocked by the intolerance
that many Americans expressed towards political radicals and immigrants following World War I.
See 2 JOHN M. MURRIN ET AL., LIBERTY, EQUALITY, POWER ENHANCED CONCISE EDITION 668 (6th
ed. 2014). Disillusioned by the popularity of conformity after World War I, a group of American
intellectuals and artists—collectively known as the “Lost Generation”—gathered in Paris in order to
transform their disillusionment into “rich literary sensibility.” Id. at 668-69.
48. Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption,
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 475. New
York’s Arbitration Law provided that written contracts to settle an existing or future dispute were
“valid, enforcible and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” Arbitration Law, ch. 72, 1920 N.Y. Laws 82, 83 (later codified in
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). The primary purpose of this law was to prevent parties from strategically
opting out of arbitration. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration
Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 269-70 (1926).
49. H. H. Nordlinger, The Law and Practice of Arbitration in New York, 13 MO. L. REV. 196,
196 (1948).
50. Zhaodong Jiang, Federal Arbitration Law and State Court Proceedings, 23 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 473, 478-79 (1990); see 1920 N.Y. Laws at 82.
51. Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101-02 (2006).
One scholar has explained the magnitude of the New York statute as follows:
[O]ne cannot overstate the significance of the single salutary reform which made
possible the extension of arbitration beyond the trade associations which were its main
breeding ground and led to its wholesale employment in standardized agreements of all
kinds. This, in turn, raised a whole host of new questions regarding public policy
limitations and one-sidedness which were not a problem when arbitration was about two
textile merchants arguing over the quality of the merchandize . . . .
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 36-37 (1992) (citation omitted).
52. Moses, supra note 51, at 101-02. The New York law served as a model for the FAA.
Caitlin J. Halligan & Gabriel K. Gillett, New York Courts at the Forefront of Arbitration Law, L.A.
DAILY J. (June 24, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Halligan-GillettNew-York-Courts-at-the-Forefront-of-Arbitration-Law-DJ-6-24-16.pdf; see Federal Arbitration
Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–15).
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money for the disputants; (4) to preserve business relationships; and (5)
to simply enforce voluntary agreements to arbitrate disputes.53
Pursuant to its commerce power, Congress passed the FAA in
1925.54 At the time the Act was passed, arbitration was typically
between merchants and other commercial parties making consensual
contracts, such as “contracts of insurance, ship charters, commercial
leases, partnership agreements, goods contracts, [and] construction
contracts.”55 However, many groups, especially labor unions, feared that
the FAA would encourage the expansion of arbitration into areas that
were not typically arbitrated.56
For instance, labor unions feared that the Act “might authorize
federal judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses in employment
contracts and collective-bargaining agreements.”57 To quash these
concerns, former Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover emphasized
that the Act would not be applicable to contracts for labor and Hoover’s
language was codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1.58 In hindsight, the fear of labor

53. MACNEIL, supra note 51, at 29-30.
54. Isham R. Jones, Note, The Federal Arbitration Act and Section 2’s “Involving
Commerce” Requirement: The Final Step Towards Complete Federal Preemption over State Law
and Policy: Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 327, 331-32; see U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). The key provision adopted from
the New York State Arbitration Act of 1920 was that contracts were “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save on such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
Arbitration Law, ch. 72, 1920 N.Y. Laws 82, 83 (later codified in 9 U.S.C. § 2).
55. Stephen A. Plass, Reforming the Federal Arbitration Act to Equalize the Adjudication
Rights of Powerful and Weak Parties, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 79, 91 (2015); Rhonda Wasserman,
Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, 44 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 391, 396 (2012).
56. Lori G. Feldman & Christopher J. Kupka, Turning Tides for Employee Arbitration
Agreements, LAW360 (Oct. 28, 2016, 11:04 AM), https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/articles/
855000/turning-tides-for-employee-arbitration-agreements.
57. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 125-27 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 127. Herbert Hoover suggested the following:
If objection appears to the inclusion of workers’ contracts in the law’s scheme, [the
FAA] might be well amended by stating “but nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of workers
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.”
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings
on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 21
(1924)); see 9 U.S.C. § 1 (stating that the FAA “shall [not] apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce”). Hoover, one of the main proponents of the FAA, believed that it would help promote
self-regulation of commercial parties. Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosis: How Forced Arbitration
Arrived in the Workplace, 35 BERKLEY J. EMP. LAB. L. 5, 11 (2014).
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unions was not unreasonable because the courts have vastly expanded
the scope of the FAA beyond that which Congress intended.59
The FAA, originally intended as a procedural statute for agreements
between commercial parties, was transformed into a substantive statute,
applicable to both federal and state courts and consumer and
employment contracts.60 As the Supreme Court expanded the scope of
the FAA, lower courts were required to grant greater deference to
arbitration agreements.61 Consequently, regardless of whether “the
parties drafting these agreements increasingly included unfair and
overreaching terms,” forced arbitration clauses were enforceable and
consumers could only seek relief from unfair agreements through the
unconscionability doctrine or through Congress.62
C. Development of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
In 2008, a financial crisis of great magnitude left millions of
Americans unemployed and resulted in devastation of private and public
wealth.63 The “predatory subprime lending” scheme led by financial
institution managers contributed to this economic recession, which
harmed shareholders and consumers.64 The harm to consumers has been
more long-lasting than to shareholders.65
59. See infra Part III.
60. Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1309, 1319-21.
The FAA was part of a larger regulatory movement towards procedural simplification in federal
courts. Szalai, supra note 47, at 119.
61. Burch, supra note 60, at 1325.
62. Id. After Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, state legislators were increasingly limited in
their ability to regulate arbitration agreements. See 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (holding that state law
could not invalidate arbitration agreements).
63. Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). In
2008, the United States underwent a “historic number of shockwaves” such as the declaration of
bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers, bailing out of AIG by the U.S. Federal Reserve System, and
enactment of countless industry bailouts by Congress. Catherine Moore, The Effect of the Dodd–
Frank Act on Arbitration Agreements: A Proposal for Consumer Choice, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
503, 504 (2012).
64. Cheryl L. Wade, Fiduciary Duty and the Public Interest, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1191, 1196-97,
1202-03 (2011); Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 63. The U.S. Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations reported that the causes of the 2008 financial crisis
included, but were not limited to, “high-risk mortgage lending, inflated credit ratings, structured
products sold by investment banks, and repeated failures of regulatory agencies to provide adequate
oversight of the financial services industry.” FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY 387 (17th ed.
2016).
65. Wade, supra note 64, at 1191-92. Consumers that do not have a diverse investment
portfolio but are bound to one investment—their home—are typically more vulnerable to economic
harm. Id. at 1192 n.2. According to Elizabeth Warren, Special Advisor to the Secretary of the
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In response to the financial crisis of 2008, Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank Act”).66 The Dodd-Frank Act was an attempt to correct the
shortcomings of the regulatory system that was in place at the time by
regulating certain aspects of the financial services industry that were
previously under-regulated or not regulated at all.67 The purpose of the
Dodd-Frank Act was to increase transparency in consumer markets of
financial services by requiring additional disclosures.68 The Dodd-Frank
Act created a number of government agencies responsible for overseeing
various components of the act, including the CFPB.69

Treasury for the CFPB, “Consumer financial protection had not been the primary focus of any
Federal agency, and no agency had effective tools to set the rules for and oversee the whole market”
before the development of the CFPB. Elizabeth Warren, Special Advisor to the Sec’y of the
Treasury for the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on TARP,
Financial Services, and Bailouts of Public and Private Programs (May 24, 2011),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/testimony-of-elizabeth-warren-before-thesubcommittee-on-tarp-financial-services-and-bailouts-of-public-and-private-programs.
66. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/doddfrank-financial-regulatory-reform-bill.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
67. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 66. Before the
creation of the CFPB, “seven different Federal agencies were responsible for various aspects of
consumer financial protection.” Megan Slack, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
101: Why We Need a Consumer Watchdog, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 4, 2012, 11:13 AM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/01/04/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-101-why-weneed-consumer-watchdog. It can be argued that the economic crisis of 2008 was inevitable since no
single agency had the ability to effectively enact rules or monitor the market. See CONSUMER FED’N
OF AM., ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 1 (2011),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFPB-Accountability-fact-sheet-6-11.pdf (“Massive regulatory
failures by these agencies led to the proliferation of unfair and unsustainable lending practices,
which deeply damaged millions of Americans and the overall economy.”).
68. Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General
After Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 126, 140-41 (2013); Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/consumer-financial-protection-bureau
(last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
69. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 66. In 2007,
Elizabeth Warren proposed the CFPB while she was a professor at Harvard Law School. Donna
Borak, President Obama, Elizabeth Warren Defend Postcrisis Financial Regulations, WALL ST. J.
(July 23, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/president-obama-elizabeth-warren-defendpostcrisis-financial-regulations-1469268001.
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1. Leadership Structure and Budget of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau
The CFPB was established as an independent bureau within the
Federal Reserve.70 Even as a subsidiary, the CFPB exercises “complete
regulatory independence from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve.”71 To promote independence of the agency, Congress allocated
an established percentage of funding from the budget of the Federal
Reserve for the CFPB.72 Additionally, a minor portion of the Bureau’s
funding originates from “receipts collected from interest on Treasury
securities and filing fees pursuant to the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act of 1968.”73
The CFPB’s independent funding and leadership structure were
designed in order to protect it from “agency capture.”74 Under the Dodd70. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2012). As a compromise to Republicans who opposed the creation
of the Bureau, the CFPB was placed within the Federal Reserve. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 72-74 (2010)
(noting that proponents of the bureau were pushed to relinquish the idea of a “freestanding agency”
in order to get the legislation passed in the Senate). Opponents of the CFPB sought to curtail the
budget—and therefore, the power of the CFPB—by making it a subsidiary of the Federal Reserve
System. See Richard Cordray, Message from Richard Cordray, in CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
THE CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, BUDGET, AND PERFORMANCE PLAN AND REPORT 3 (2016),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201602_cfpb_report_strategic-plan-budget-and-performanceplan_FY2016.pdf (explaining that as an independent Bureau within the Federal Reserve, the CFPB
is funded primarily from transfers made by the Board of Governors by the Federal Reserve System
from the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System).
71. Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 340 (2012).
72. Totten, supra note 68, at 125. The sources and the quantity of funding received by the
CFPB are as follows:
Funding required to support the CFPB’s operations is obtained primarily through
transfers from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Transfers are
capped at a pre-set percentage of the total 2009 operating expenses of the Federal
Reserve System, subject to an annual adjustment. Beginning in FY 2014, transfers to the
Bureau are capped at 12 percent of the Federal Reserve System’s operating expenses.
Transfer caps are adjusted annually based on the percentage increase in the employment
cost index by the Federal Government for total compensation for state and local
government workers as specified in the Dodd-Frank Act.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, BUDGET, AND PERFORMANCE PLAN
AND REPORT 21 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201502_cfpb_report_strategic-planbudget-and-performance-plan_FY2014-2016.pdf. In order for the CFPB to extend its budget beyond
the cap, the United States House Committee on Appropriations must pass an appropriation bill.
Michael C. Nissim-Sabat, Capturing This Watchdog? The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Keeping the Special Interests Out of Its House, 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 20 (2012).
73. Richard Cordray, supra note 70, at 20.
74. See Nissim-Sabat, supra note 72, at 20-21, 25. Agency capture reflects the idea that
“government regulation reflects the influence of special interests, and is created and operated for
their advantage.” Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169 (1990).
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Frank Act, the CFPB was to be led by a single director—only removable
by the President for cause—with a maximum term of five years.75 A
single leader ostensibly permits more efficient execution of decisions
than a board composed of several commissioners and therefore, better
promotes consumers’ interests.76 Recently, however, a federal court of
appeals has struck down the “for cause” provision and effectively
permits the director to be removed by the President at will.77

75. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3); Eyder Peralta, Federal Court Rules Consumer Watchdog’s
Structure Is Unconstitutional, NPR (Oct. 11, 2016, 12:46 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/10/11/497533963/federal-court-rules-consumer-watchdogs-structure-is-unconstitutional.
76. See Jennifer Liberto, Consumer Bureau ‘Stalinistic’ - Republican Senator, CNN MONEY
(Dec. 12, 2011, 10:33 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/12/12/news/economy/consumer_bureau_
stalin. Traditionally government agencies run by a single leader are removable by the president at
will. Peralta, supra note 75. Diversity in leadership of the CFPB may be critical since “[t]here is no
single point of view that dominates this group, other than a shared vision to make consumer
financial markets work better for all Americans.” See Warren, supra note 65.
77. Peralta, supra note 75. The author of this Note recognizes that the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia has recently deemed the existing structure of the CFPB—a single
director loosely accountable to the Executive and only removable for good cause—to
be unconstitutional. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016),
vacated, No. 15-1177, at 1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017). However, it should be noted that rather than
eliminating the CFPB altogether, the Court of Appeals directed an amendment of the statute that
created the agency. See PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at. 8-9. The amendment would provide the Executive
the ability to remove the director of the CFPB at will, “as well as exert direct supervision and
direction over a watchdog that has had unprecedented authority over home finance, student loans,
credit cards and banking practices.” Kevin McCoy, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Structure Ruled Unconstitutional, USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2016, 3:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/money/2016/10/11/consumer-agency-structure-ruledunconstitutional/91902146; see PHH
Corp., 839 F.3d at. 8 (“With the for-cause provision severed, the President now will have the power
to remove the Director at will, and to supervise and direct the Director. The CFPB therefore will
continue to operate and to perform its many duties . . . .”). On February 6, 2017, the ruling was
vacated and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was scheduled to rehear the case on May 24, 2017.
Alan Kaplinksy & Michael Guerrero, The CFPB Is Under Siege By All Three Branches of the
Government, HILL (Feb. 17, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/320141the-cfpb-is-under-siege-by-all-three-branches-of-government; see PHH Corp., No. 15-1177, at 1. A
recently proposed Senate bill seeks to replace the single director with a five-member “Board of
Directors.” S. 105, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). Banking associations have also advocated for the
leadership structure of the CFPB to be changed into a multi-member committee. See 5-Person
CFPB Board Would Provide Continuity: CUNA to Congress, CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N (Nov.
23, 2015), http://news.cuna.org/articles/108538-cuna-to-congress-5-person-cfpb-board-wouldprovide-continuity (stating that the Credit Union National Association and its partners have
proposed that the CFPB operate as a five-member committee in order to function as a non-partisan
consumer protection agency).
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2. Current State of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
The CFPB began operating on July 21, 2011.78 The Bureau’s early
work centered around “hiring within the complex federal process,
securing physical facilities, acquiring technological systems, and writing
office policies and procedures, as well as designing, drafting, and
implementing federal regulations on investigative procedures and
administrative adjudication.”79 However, the CFPB’s early enforcement
operations were delayed by the Senate’s failure to confirm the Bureau’s
first Director, Richard Cordray, for nearly two years.80
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB was given jurisdiction to
regulate the activities of consumer financial products or services through
rulemaking, supervisory actions, and enforcement actions.81 The CFPB
functions “[to] protect consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive
practices and take action against companies that break the law.”82

78. Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An
Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057, 1076 (2016); CFPB Ready to Help Consumers on Day
One, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (July 21, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-ready-to-help-consumers-on-day-one.
79. Peterson, supra note 78, at 1076. For the rules relating to investigations see 12 C.F.R. pt.
1080 (2012).
80. Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,
7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 36, 40, 42 (2012). Pursuant to the Appointments Clause of
the Constitution:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Minsters and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law . . . .
U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2, cl. 2. Although she was the brainchild and forerunner to serve as the
director of the CFPB, former President Obama did not nominate Elizabeth Warren to serve as the
Bureau’s director. Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 862 (2013). The Obama Administration suspected that the Senate
would not confirm the potential appointment of Warren due to strong Republican opposition to
Warren’s political views. Id. Instead, former President Obama appointed Warren to serve as the
Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury on the CFPB
in order to help design the Bureau. Elizabeth Warren Biography, BIOGRAPHY,
http://www.biography.com/people/elizabeth-warren-20670753#political-career (last updated Feb. 8,
2017). In July 2013, Richard Cordray was appointed by former President Obama appointed
and then confirmed by the Senate as director of the CFPB. Danielle Douglas, Senate Confirms
Cordray to Head Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, WASH. POST (July 16, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/senate-confirms-consumer-watchdognomineerichard-cordray/2013/07/16/965d82c2-ee2b-11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.html.
81. Jasmine S. Chean, Note, Can’t Live with Them, Can’t Live Without Them: How Mini
CFPAs and Surety Bonds Could Make a World with Debt Settlement Companies More Bearable, 21
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 379, 391-92 (2016). For the detailed process of rulemaking for federal
administrative agencies, see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C § 553 (2012).
82. The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/the-bureau (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
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Beginning in 2012, “the CFPB’s investigations and exams began to bear
fruit in public law enforcement.”83 Between 2012 and 2015, the CFPB
took the following actions:
[T]he Bureau announced 8 public enforcement actions. By the time the
Senate confirmed Director Cordray on July 16, 2013, the Bureau had
announced 17 public enforcement cases, including 6 against large
banks and 11 against nonbank financial companies. In the calendar
year 2013, the Bureau announced 27 actions. In 2014 and 2015, the
Bureau announced 32 and 55 actions, respectively. Over the first 4
years of the Bureau’s active enforcement program, the number of
public enforcement actions has roughly tracked the Bureau’s
recruitment of staff.84

In 2015, the CFPB continued to aggressively conduct enforcement
actions and looked towards proposing rules.85 Before proposing a rule,
the CFPB was required to conduct a study examining the prevalence and
impact of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.86 The study
examined arbitration clauses in six different consumer finance markets:
(1) credit cards, (2) checking accounts, (3) prepaid cards, (4) payday
loans, (5) private student loans, and (6) mobile wireless contracts.87 The
83. Peterson, supra note 78, at 1076. The CFPB may commence enforcement actions against
an entity or a person provided that the Bureau believes that the entity or person has violated the law.
Enforcement Actions, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
policy-compliance/enforcement/actions (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). The enforcement action may be
commenced by filing an action in federal district court or by initiating an administrative
adjudication proceeding. Id.; see Christopher J. Willis, CFPB’s Enforcement Rules: A “Rocket
Docket” that Looks Strangely Familiar, BALLARD SPHAR LLP (Aug. 8, 2011),
https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2011/08/08/cfpbs-enforcement-rules-a-rocket-docket-that-looksstrangely-familiar (“In devising its rules for administrative enforcement proceedings, the CFPB
seems to have taken the view that speed is the overriding goal.”). The administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) conducts administrative proceedings in which the ALJ holds hearings and issues a
recommended decision. 28 C.F.R. § 4.14 (2016); Enforcement Actions, supra.
84. Peterson, supra note 78, at 1076-77.
85. See Joseph L. Barloon et al., CFPB Pursues Aggressive Enforcement Agenda and
Arbitration Restrictions, in 2016 INSIGHTS 102 (Thomas H. Kennedy et al. eds., 2015),
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/2016_Insights.pdf.
86. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a); see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT
TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL ST. REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT § 1028(A) (2015) [hereinafter CFPB FINAL REPORT], http://files.consumer
finance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf.
87. See generally id. The author of this Note acknowledges that the accuracy of the study
conducted by the CFPB has been criticized. See Dani Kass, CFPB Accused of Withholding Public
Arbitration Study Docs, LAW360 (Dec. 14, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/872293/cfpb-accused-of-withholding-public-arbitration-study-docs. For a further discussion
on the shortcomings of the CFPB’s study, see The CFPB’s Flawed Arbitration “Study”, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COM., (Mar. 8, 2016, 11:45 AM), https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/the-cfpb-sflawed-arbitration-study.
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study, publicly available as of March 2015, concluded that “[t]ens of
millions of consumers use financial products or services that are subject
to pre-dispute arbitration clauses.”88 For example, 99.9% of mobile
wireless providers use arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.89
In October 2015, the CFPB proceeded with its first potential
rulemaking to limit arbitration agreements in certain consumer financial
products and services.90 The proposed rule was finally published in the
Federal Register on May 24, 2016.91 As proposed, the rule seeks to ban
class action waivers in pre-dispute arbitration clauses and requires the
submission of arbitral claims and awards to the CFPB.92 Consequently,
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts would still be valid, but they
must explicitly state that consumers are not prohibited from being part of
a class action in court.93 Additionally, the enforceability of arbitration
awards would be conditioned upon submission of specified arbitral
records to the CFPB.94 During the ninety-day comment period, closing
on August 22, 2016,95 the CFPB was flooded with over 120,000
comments in response to the proposed rule.96
The final rule, including the aforementioned limitations and
restrictions on pre-dispute arbitration clauses, was published in the
Federal Register on July 19, 2017.97 However, President Trump recently
repealed this rule such that it has “no force or effect.”98

88. CFPB FINAL REPORT, supra note 86, § 1.4.1.
89. Id. § 2.3 & tbl.1.
90. See generally SMALL BUS. ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY
REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS (2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_small-business-review-panel-packet-explainingthe-proposal-under-consideration.pdf.
91. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,829, 32,830 (proposed May 24, 2015) (codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040 (2017)). The proposed rule was in part motivated by AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). Bleich & Patashnik, supra note 43, at 39-40. For a discussion on
Concepcion, see infra Part III.C.1.
92. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg., at 32,830.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Arbitration Agreements, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser
?rpp=25&so=DESC&sb=commentDueDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=CFPB-2016-0020 (last visited
Nov. 15, 2017).
97. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210, 33,210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1040 (2017)).
98. See Pub. L. No. 115-74 (2017); see also Office of Press Sec’y, President Donald J. Trump
Signs H.J.Res. 111 into Law, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 1, 2017) https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/11/01/president-donald-j-trump-signs-hjres-111-law.
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3. Shortcomings of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
The CFPB has limited resources for enforcement, and state
attorneys general have done little to implement their new powers under
the Dodd-Frank Act.99 Consequently, consumers are left with the burden
of learning about their rights and having to actively pursue remedies.100
Consumers must contact and submit complaints to the Consumer
Response Team of the CFPB.101 The complaints are then published by
the CFPB on its “Consumer Complaint Database,” which “affords the
public direct insight into the patterns of consumer problems around the
country.”102 Finding violations of consumer financial law, the CFPB has
proceeded to penalize financial institutions.103
III.

THE UNINTENDED EXPANSION OF ARBITRATION

Having discussed the development, current practice, and state of
law of arbitration, this Part expands upon the shortcomings and public
99. Amy J. Schmitz, Remedy Realities in Business-to-Consumer Contracting, 51 ARIZ. L.
REV. 213, 220, 227-29 (2016). The CFPB provides consumers with the “Ask CFPB” tool that offers
direct public insight into the frequently asked questions. See Ask CFPB, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). This
tool is designed to be interactive as consumers can pose new questions or provide potential
modifications to existing answers. Richard Cordray, Protecting Consumers in the Financial
Marketplace: Keynote Address, November 2, 2012, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 10-11.
100. Schmitz, supra note 99, at 220. The CFPB has taken measures to educate consumers
about the relinquished rights stemming from arbitration clauses. Cordray, supra note 99, at 5-8.
101. Richard Cordray, Message from Richard Cordray, in CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT: JULY 21 - DECEMBER 31, 2011, at 2 (2012),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201204_cfpb_ConsumerResponseAnnualReport.pdf.
102. Cordray, supra note 99, at 10-12. For the Consumer Complaint Database, see Consumer
Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
complaintdatabase (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
103. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Takes Action Against Bridgepoint Education, Inc.
for Illegal Student Lending Practices, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Sept. 12, 2016),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-takesaction-against-bridgepoint-education-inc-illegal-student-lending-practices (“[T]he CFPB has the
authority to take action against institutions violating consumer financial laws; including engaging
in unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.”); see, e.g., Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly
Opening Unauthorized Accounts, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau
-fines-wells-fargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-opening-unauthorized-accounts
(“[T]he Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) fined Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. $100 million
for the widespread illegal practice of secretly opening unauthorized deposit and credit card
accounts.”); Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Takes Action Against Bridgepoint Education,
Inc. for Illegal Student Lending Practices, supra (“The Bureau is ordering Bridgepoint to discharge
all outstanding private loans the institution made to its students and to refund loan payments already
made by borrowers. Loan forgiveness and refunds will total over $23.5 million in automatic
consumer relief. Bridgepoint must also pay an $8 million civil penalty to the Bureau.”).
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policy concerns created by mandatory arbitration agreements.104 This
Part also discusses the inherent unequal bargaining power between
commercial parties and consumers, and explains how the lower standard
of care that financial advisers owe to patrons already further
disadvantages consumers.105 Lastly, this Part examines a recent example
of preemption of state consumer protection law by federal law and the
near dissolution of the unconscionability doctrine.106
A. Inherent Unequal Bargaining Power in Consumer Contracts
Contracts of adhesion are apparent in nearly all consumer
contracts.107 Consumer contracts are typically offered on a “take-it-orleave-it” basis in which the consumer must either accept the terms of the
contract or take her business elsewhere.108 However, even if the
consumer were to seek services elsewhere, she would most likely face a
similar dilemma.109 Consequently, consumer contracts are often
contracts of adhesion in which the drafting party—almost always the
commercial party—selects all the contract terms and therefore creates a
power imbalance between the contracting parties.110
Moreover, commercial parties typically hire sophisticated lawyers
to draft the terms of the contract that are in the best interest of the
commercial party.111 On the contrary, consumers do not typically consult
lawyers before entering into contracts for everyday services, and as a
result, equal access to information is seldom found in these contracting
relationships.112 Information asymmetry exists when contracting parties
do not have equal access to information.113 Information asymmetry
frustrates the freedom of contract theory.114
104. See infra Part III.
105. See infra Part III.A–B.
106. See infra Part III.C.
107. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). An adhesion
contract is defined as “a standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by another party
in a weaker position, usu. a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice about the
terms.” Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
108. Sierra David Sterkin, Comment, Challenging Adhesion Contracts in California: A
Consumer’s Guide, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 285-86, 289-91 (2004).
109. Id. at 286.
110. See Richard P. Sybert, Adhesion Theory in California: A Suggested Redefinition and Its
Application to Banking, 11 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 297, 301 (1978).
111. See Sterkin, supra note 108, at 287.
112. See id.
113. Eric H. Franklin, Mandating Precontractual Disclosure, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 553, 561
(2013).
114. Id. at 563-64. Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson describes the classic
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In the context of mandatory arbitration clauses, the commercial
party typically retains the ability to select the arbitrator or the arbitration
institution and therefore, the “repeat player” phenomenon may have
potentially deleterious effects on consumers.115 Unlike judges who
receive a predetermined salary, arbitrators are generally only paid when
they are selected to resolve a dispute.116 As a result, arbitrators may be
incentivized to favor the commercial party—the repeat player—who
may be likely select them to arbitrate claims again.117 Therefore, some
scholars believe that arbitrators have biases favoring commercial parties
since their livelihoods are dependent upon being selected to resolve
future disputes.118 Since arbitration records are often subject to
confidentiality, consumers may be unable to discover repeated bad
conduct and hold arbitrators accountable.119
B. Restrictions on Imposing Fiduciary Relationships
In the context of consumer contracts for financial services,
customers must be wary since not until recently have all financial
theory of freedom of contract as follows:
It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that a
given contract is void as being against public policy, because if there is one thing which
more than another public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when
entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts
of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider—that you are
not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.
Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson [1873] 19 LR Eq. 462, 465 (Eng.).
115. JULIA HÖRNLE, CROSS-BORDER INTERNET DISPUTE RESOLUTION 172 (2009); see Lisa B.
Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J., Fall
1997, at 189, 210 (discussing results from a study that showed repeat-player arbitrators held in favor
of employees for only eleven percent of claims in employment disputes, while non-repeat-player
arbitrators found in favor of employees in forty-eight percent of claims). The National Arbitration
Forum, the American Arbitration Association, and JAMS handle the majority of arbitration cases
for large corporations. Is Credit Card Arbitration Fair for Consumers?, CREDIT INFOCENTER,
http://www.creditinfocenter.com/cards/credit-card-arbitration.shtml (last updated July 13, 2017);
see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, A ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at A1 (“Arbitration records obtained by The Times found that 41 arbitrators
each handled 10 or more cases for one company between 2010 and 2014.”).
116. HÖRNLE, supra note 115, at 124.
117. Part 7 Awards: Commentary, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 267 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds.,
2005).
118. David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study
of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 71 (2015).
119. See Jim Lardner, A Corporate ‘Get Out of Jail Free’ Card, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Sept. 6, 2013, 5:15 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/09/06/
forced-arbitration-is-a-corporate-get-out-of-jail-free-card.
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advisors been required to act as fiduciaries.120 Fiduciaries must act in the
best interest of the client, manage the client’s money and property
carefully, keep the client’s money and property separate from her own,
and to keep accounting records for the client.121 A fiduciary relationship
may “arise[] when the parties are in certain special relationships such as
a principal-agent, attorney-client, and guardian-ward” as well as “when a
person entrusts another with money or property.”122 Courts may have
discretion to impose an informal fiduciary relationship when parties
have unequal bargaining power and the stronger party has an incentive
to take advantage of the weaker party.123 However, absent proof that
120. See Look for an Adviser with Fiduciary Duty to Save Money on Your IRA, CONSUMER
REPS. (July 7, 2015, 10:45 AM), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2015/07/look-for-anadviser-with-fiduciary-duty-to-save-money-on-your-ira/index.htm. For example, insurance agents
or producers, and brokers were held to a suitability standard. Keith Ellis, Why It’s Important to
Know Whether Your Adviser Is a Fiduciary, KIPLINGER (Dec. 2016), http://www.kiplinger.com/
article/investing/T023-C032-S014-important-know-whether-your-adviser-is-a-fiduciary.html.
On
the contrary, investment advisers are held to the fiduciary standard. Information for NewlyRegistered Investment Advisers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/investment/advoverview.htm (last modified Mar. 31, 2017). The term “investment
adviser” is defined as “an individual or company that is registered as such with either the Securities
and Exchange Commission or a state securities regulator.” Investment Advisers, FIN. INDUSTRY
REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/investors/investment-advisers (last visited Nov. 15, 2017);
see Investment Advisers: What You Need to Know Before Choosing One, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/invadvisers.htm (Aug. 7, 2012) (“For instance,
individuals or firms that receive compensation for giving advice on investing in stocks, bonds,
mutual funds, or exchange traded funds are investment advisers.”).
121. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, MANAGING SOMEONE ELSE’S MONEY: HELP FOR
AGENTS UNDER POWER OF ATTORNEY 6 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb
_lay_fiduciary_guides_agents.pdf. For the entire guidelines released by the CFPB that explain the
responsibilities of a fiduciary, see id. The guidelines created by the CFPB were particularly targeted
for financers acting on behalf of older Americans since many older Americans are vulnerable to
fraud and scam as they experience declining capacity to handle finances. CFPB Releases Guides
for Managing Someone Else’s Money, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Oct. 29, 2013),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-releases-guides-for-managing-someoneelses-money.
122. Budnitz, supra note 19, at 269; see Mark E. Budnitz, The Sale of Credit Life Insurance:
The Bank as Fiduciary, 62 N.C. L. REV. 295, 299-301 (1984).
123. Budnitz, supra note 122, at 300; see Hydro-Mill Co. v. Hayward, Tilton & Rolapp Ins.
Assocs., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 582, 593 (Ct. App. 2004) (“The insurer-insured relationship . . . is not a
true ‘fiduciary relationship’ in the same sense as the relationship between trustee and beneficiary, or
attorney and client. . . . It is, rather, a relationship often characterized by unequal bargaining
power . . . in which the insured must depend on the good faith and performance of the insurer . . . .
This characteristic has led the courts to impose ‘special and heightened’ duties, but ‘[w]hile these
“special” duties are akin to, and often resemble, duties which are also owed by fiduciaries, the
fiduciary-like duties arise because of the unique nature of the insurance contract, not because the
insurer is a fiduciary.’” (quoting Vu v. Prudential Prop. & Casualty Ins. Co., 33 P.3d 487, 492 (Cal.
2001))); Tran v. Farmers Grp. 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 735 (Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted) (“The
insurer-insured relationship is not a true fiduciary relationship . . . . It is, rather, a relationship often
characterized by unequal bargaining power in which the insured must depend on the good faith and

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 16

382

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:363

both parties understood that the weaker party reposed trust or confidence
in the stronger party, and both parties reasonably expected that the
stronger party was to act on behalf of the weaker party, courts seldom
impose fiduciary relationships.124
Historically, many financial advisors were held to the suitability
standard—a less stringent obligation than the fiduciary standard.125
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) rule 2111 requires
that firms or associated people “have a reasonable basis to believe a
recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or
securities is suitable for the customer.”126 Rule 2111 lists three main
suitability obligations for firms and associated persons: (1) reasonablebasis suitability,127 (2) customer-specific suitability,128 and (3)
quantitative suitability.129
performance of the insurer.”); ADT Operations Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 662 N.Y.S.2d 190,
195 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (“New York courts have never adopted the notion that a mere debtor/creditor
relationship between a bank and a customer creates a fiduciary duty, and have imposed such a duty
only in extreme cases involving grossly unequal bargaining power or the domination or control of
the customer by the bank.”).
124. Budnitz, supra note 122, at 308-09. For example, a fiduciary relationship may be imposed
between a lender and customer upon findings that the customer reposed trust in the lender. Id. at
327. However, “if customers are required to show that they reposed trust and confidence in the
bank, they will face substantial problems of proofs.” Id.
125. See Kate Dore, What the New DOL Fiduciary Rule Means for You, MAGNIFY MONEY
(June 9, 2017), http://www.magnifymoney.com/blog/consumer-watchdog/new-dol-fiduciary-rulemeans; Blake Fambrough, Why Fees and the Fiduciary Standard Matter to Investors,
NERDWALLET (June 24, 2016), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/investing/fees-fiduciary-standardmatter-investors. Currently, most investment advisors are only held to the suitability standard,
however, the Department of Labor has recently mandated that advisers to retirement assets hold
themselves to the fiduciary standard. Employee Benefits Security Administration, 81 Fed. Reg.
20,946, 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).
126. See FINRA § 2111 (FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. 2014) (emphasis added); see also
Suitability, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/industry/suitability (last visited
Nov. 15, 2017). FINRA is “[a]n independent organization authorized by Congress to enforce the
organization’s rules governing securities broker-dealers.” Financial Regulatory Authority, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
127. Suitability, supra note 126. Reasonable-basis suitability requires that a broker must “have
a reasonable basis to believe, based on reasonable diligence, that the recommendation is suitable for
at least some investors.” Id.
128. Id. Customer-specific suitability requires that “a broker-dealer must make
recommendations based on a customer’s financial situation and needs as well as other security
holdings, to the extent known.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS
AND BROKER-DEALERS 63 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
129. Suitability, supra note 126. BRADLEY BERMAN, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
FINRA RULE 2111 – SUITABILITY 2-3 (2016), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/faq-finra-rule2111-suitability.pdf. Quantitative suitability requires that “[a] person who has actual or de facto
control over a customer account to have a reasonable basis to believe that a series of recommended
transactions, even if suitable when viewed in isolation, are not excessive and unsuitable for the
customer when taken together in light of the customer’s investment profile.” Id.
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The reasonable basis was based upon information obtained through
the “reasonable diligence” of the firm or the associated person to
understand the customer’s investment profile.130 The following
information composes a customer’s investment profile: “age, other
investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment
objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity
needs, risk tolerance, and any other information that the customer may
disclose to the member or associated person in connection with such
recommendation.”131 Asking a client for the aforementioned profile
information usually suffices to satisfy the requisite due diligence.132
Unlike the fiduciary standard, the suitability standard did not require that
financial advisors give advice in the best interest of the client.133
Consequently, the suitability standard allows for conflicts of interest.134
Conflicts of interest may arise when financial services professionals
earn a commission on the product sold to a consumer.135 Financial
advisors could recommend any action provided that the action meets the
suitability standard—even if such is the least suitable action.136 As a
result, the financial advisor could be motivated to sell the financial
product or service generating the greatest revenue rather than the service
or product that is best suited for the consumer.137 Consumers were
130. FINRA r. 2111(a); Suitability: What Investors Need to Know, FIN. INDUSTRY REG.
AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/investors/suitability-what-investors-need-know (last visited Nov.
15, 2017).
131. FINRA r. 2111(a).
132. Suitability: What Investors Need to Know, supra note 130. Reasonable diligence requires
that “if the client exhibits signs of diminished capacity or other ‘red flags’ then the broker can have
reasonable course to believe their information is inaccurate and should be cautious about
recommending a transaction.” John Nedge, 3 Key Points to Understanding FINRA Rule 2111 on
Suitability, POCKET RISK BLOG, http://blog.pocketrisk.com/3-key-points-to-understanding-finrarule-2111-on-suitability (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
133. Peter Lazaroff, The Difference Between Fiduciary and Suitability Standards, FORBES
(Apr. 6, 2016, 12:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterlazaroff/2016/04/06/the-differencebetween-fiduciary-and-suitability-standards/#3062ccaf35bf.
134. Alex Madlener, Fiduciary or Suitability Standard?, OPENCIRCLE WEALTH PARTNERS
(Sept. 14, 2015), http://opencirclewealth.com/fiduciary-or-suitability-standard. A conflict of interest
arises when “a person has a duty to more than one person or organization, but cannot do justice to
the actual or potentially adverse interests of both parties.” Conflict of Interest, LAW.COM,
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=292 (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
135. Jason Bromberg & Alicia P. Cackley, Regulating Planners: Assessing the Current System
and Some Alternative, in THE MARKET FOR RETIREMENT FINANCIAL ADVICE 312 (Olivia S.
Mitchell & Kent Smetters eds., 2013).
136. Sheyna Steiner, How the Fiduciary Standard Protects You, BANKRATE (June 19, 2012),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/investing/fiduciary-standard-1.aspx.
137. Bromberg & Cackley, supra note 135, at 312. The author of this Note acknowledges that
there are two predominant compensation structures for advisors: (1) a fee-based model and (2) a
transaction-based model. BOB HERGET, FINANCIAL ADVISORS, HIDDEN FEES, INCENTIVES &
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further disadvantaged since they usually must arbitrate any dispute
arising from the transaction with the financial adviser.138
C. Limited Application of the Savings Clause of the
Federal Arbitration Act
The Supreme Court has vastly limited the use of the “savings
clause” to protect consumers against unfair arbitration agreements.139
The savings clause of the FAA provides limitations on the enforcement
of arbitration agreements in contracts.140 The clause states that
arbitration agreements are generally valid and enforceable “save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”141 The intended purpose of the FAA was “to place arbitration
agreements on the same footing as other contracts.”142 However,
“the United States Supreme Court has thwarted the equal footing
policy established in the FAA and replaced it with a judicial policy
favoring arbitration.”143
1. Limitations on State Consumer Protection Law
Where state law prohibits arbitration based on grounds of public
policy or reasonable expectations, federal law generally preempts state
law.144 According to the Supremacy Clause, state courts are forbidden
STANDARDS: THE FORCES DRIVING INVESTMENT ADVICE 6-7 (2015), http://safeharborpartners.com/
wp-content/uploads/SHP-Fee-Transparency.pdf. In the fee-based model, advisors “receive a
percentage of total assets under management” and therefore, “[t]he better the accounts perform, the
greater the compensation the advisor receives.” Id. at 6. On the contrary, in a transaction-based
model, income is dependent upon commissions “directly tied to the market activity and market
conditions.” THE INVESTMENT BANKING HANDBOOK 409 (J. Peter Williamson ed., 1988).
138. See Adam J. Gana & Christopher L. Lufrano, The Inconsistent Dispute Resolution
Process for Investment Advisers, A.B.A., Mar. 2013, at 1, https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/dispute_resolution_magazine/Gana_Lufrano_TheInconsistentDispute
ResolutionProcessforInvestmentAdvisers.authcheckdam.pdf.
139. Niall Mackay Roberts, Note, Definitional Avoidance: Arbitration’s Common-Law
Meaning and the Federal Arbitration Act, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1557-58 (2016).
140. Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 729,
733 (2012).
141. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
142. Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 94 (2012).
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, No. 16–32, slip. op. at 9 (U.S. May
15, 2017) (“As we did just last Term, we once again ‘reach a conclusion that . . . falls well within
the confines of (and goes no further than) present well-established law.’ The Kentucky Supreme
Court specifically impeded the ability of attorneys-in-fact to enter into arbitration agreements. The
court thus flouted the FAA’s command to place those agreements on an equal footing with all other
contracts.” (quoting DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015))); Roberts, supra note
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“to dissociate themselves from federal law because of disagreement with
its content or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of its
source.”145 Whether a particular federal law preempts an existing law is
dependent upon the congressional intent of the federal law.146 Congress
may express its purpose explicitly through the language of the legislation
or impliedly through the structure and purpose of legislation.147 Under
the Supremacy Clause, from which the preemption doctrine is derived,
“any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power,
which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.”148
The preemption of state consumer protection law by federal judicial
policy favoring arbitration is apparent in the Supreme Court’s decision
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.149 In Concepcion, Vincent and
Lisa Concepcion entered into an agreement for the sale and servicing of
cellular telephones with AT&T Mobility LLC (“AT&T”).150 The
contract provided for arbitration of all disputes between the parties and
prohibited class action suits.151 The dispute arose from AT&T’s
marketing of the cellphones as free of charge.152 Although the
Concepcions did not pay the retail price for the cellphones, they were
still charged sales tax ($30.22) based on the retail price of the phones.153
The Concepcions originally filed a complaint in a California federal
district court claiming that AT&T “engaged in false advertising and
fraud by charging sales tax on phones it advertised as free.”154 Pursuant
to the arbitration clause in the agreement, AT&T moved to compel
139, at 1558. Federal preemption is the principle in which “federal law can supersede or supplant
any inconsistent state law or regulation.” Preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Express preemption occurs when “a federal law explicitly overrides state law” whereas implied
preemption occurs when “(a) it is impossible to comply with both state and federal requirements, or
(b) state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.’” LAUREN SAUNDERS & ANDREW PIZOR, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
PREEMPTION OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS: DODD-FRANK CHANGES AND THE
NEW (OLD) BARNETT STANDARD 1, 9 (2011), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/conferences_and_
webinars/webinar_trainings/presentations/2011-2012/preemption_webinar_nov_2011.pdf.
145. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 468 (quoting Howlet v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990)); see U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
146. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 397-98
(2004).
147. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
148. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (quoting Free v. Bland,
369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).
149. See 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
150. Id. at 336.
151. Id. at 336-37.
152. Id. at 337.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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arbitration, but the Concepcions “contend[ed] that the arbitration
agreement was unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory under
California law because it disallowed class wide procedures.”155
Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court stated that the savings
clause of the FAA “permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by
‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or
that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is
at issue.”156 In Concepcion, the Court held that the savings clause did not
intend “to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”157 The Court warned
consumers that the FAA “cannot be held to destroy itself.”158
Consequently, preemption of state consumer protection laws by the FAA
has harmed states’ abilities to monitor abuses in consumer markets.159
2. Limitations of Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine
While the Supreme Court has sanctioned use of the
unconscionability doctrine, Concepcion left little room for its actual
155. Id. at 337-38.
156. Id. at 339 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
157. Id. at 343.
158. Id. (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-28, (1998)).
159. Preemption, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., http://www.nclc.org/issues/preemption.html
(last visited Nov. 15, 2017); see, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533
(2012) (per curiam) (“West Virginia’s prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate
personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting
arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the
FAA.”); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 353 P.3d 741, 757 (Cal. 2015) (“We conclude that the
CLRA’s [Consumer Legal Remedies Act] anti-waiver provision is preempted insofar as it bars class
waivers in arbitration agreements covered by the FAA.”); Estate of Ruszala v. Brookdale Living
Cmtys., Inc., 1 A.3d 806, 818-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (“Our State’s prohibition of
arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts, designed to protect the elderly, is thus
irreconcilable with our national policy favoring arbitration as a forum for dispute resolution. Under
our federal system of government, national policy prevails. Therefore, the FAA’s clear authorization
nullifies the specific prohibition of arbitration provisions in nursing home or assisted living
facilities’ contracts contained in N.J.S.A. 30:13-8.1.”); Schiffer v. Slomin’s, Inc., 11 N.Y.S.3d 799,
802 (App. Div. 2015) (“General Business Law § 399–c is a categorical rule prohibiting mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, and thus, at least where there exists a nexus with interstate
commerce, is displaced by the FAA.”). Although the preemptive scope of the FAA is broad, states
may enact consumer protection laws limiting arbitration under the following circumstances: “(1)
where state arbitration laws act as a ‘gap-filler’ to the FAA; (2) where the FAA provides rules for
federal courts without preempting different state court rules; and (3) where parties expressly
contract for state law to apply.” Caroline Harris Crowne & Julia E. Markley, Federal Arbitration
Act Preempts Oregon Legislature’s 2007 Amendment to Oregon Arbitration Act, LITIG. J., Summer
2008, at 4, 6 (2008), http://tonkon.com/assets/documents/news//Federal%20Arbitration%20Act%20
Preempts%20Oregon%20Legislature's%202007%20Amendment%20to%20Oregon%20Arbitration
%20Act.pdf.
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application.160 Traditionally, unconscionable agreements are those “such
as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.”161
However, courts and academic institutions have developed different
definitions of unconscionability.162 The Uniform Commercial Code
(“U.C.C.”) establishes a litmus test of determining unconscionability by
looking to “[w]hether, in the light of the general commercial background
and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.”163 The
U.C.C. treats unconscionable contracts and clauses as follows:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.164

Typically, courts recognize two types of unconscionability: (1)
procedural unconscionability and (2) substantive unconscionability.165
Procedural unconscionability refers to the circumstances in which the
contract was formed,166 while substantive unconscionability refers to the
literal terms of the contract.167
160. See supra Part III.C.1.
161. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen,
[1750] 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100).
162. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 189-90 (2004). The Uniform Commercial Code “states
simply that a court may refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or clause, or may limit an
unconscionable clause to avoid an unconscionable result.” Id. at 190 (citing U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM.
LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS)). Unconscionability has
been criticized for its vagueness and uncertainty. See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing
Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 84-85 (2006). Additionally, many
law and economics supporters claim that unconscionability undermines economic efficiency
because “individuals are perfectly rational and have all necessary information which they use to
make contract choices and that enforcement of these rational choices will maximize overall societal
wealth.” Id. at 75.
163. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
164. Id. § 2-302(1).
165. Richard Craswell, Two Kinds of Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability, LAW &
ECON. WORKSHOP, Apr. 12, 2010, at 1, 1, http://www.escholarship.org/help_copyright.html#reuse.
166. See id.; see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (stating that procedural unconscionability refers to whether the party was given a
meaningful choice in the matter).
167. Craswell, supra note 165, at 1.
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Before Concepcion, the defense of unconscionability was “firmly
but uncomfortably” permitted as a defense against arbitration.168 The
Supreme Court went so far as to say that “[s]tates may not . . . decide
that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service,
credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.”169
Concepcion further limited the ability of consumers to invoke
unconscionability as a defense against enforcing arbitration clauses.170
Although a generally applicable contract defense would otherwise be
preserved by the savings clause, laws protecting against
unconscionability are preempted when “applied in a fashion that
disfavors arbitration.”171 Moreover, Concepcion further muddied the
waters regarding the application of the unconscionability doctrine
because the Supreme Court was unclear about how the unconscionability
doctrine could be reconciled with the FAA.172
IV.

MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION SHOULD BE
PROHIBITED OR RESTRICTED BY LEGISLATION

Due to the unequal bargaining power between parties, as well as the
nearly unrestrained use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, the
use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts is
contrary to public policy and thus should be prohibited or at the very
least, restricted.173 Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses should be
completely restricted through legislation prohibiting the use of these
clauses in consumer contracts.174 Alternatively, this Note also suggests
that the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts should be limited through legislation, thereby, minimizing the
impact of the pubic policy concerns previously discussed in this Note.175

168. Stephen E. Friedman, A Pro-Congress Approach to Arbitration and Unconscionability,
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 53, 55 (2011).
169. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
170. Wilson, supra note 142, at 118-19; see Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93, 492 n.9
(1987) (“A court may not . . . rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a
state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to
effect what we hold today the state legislature cannot.”).
171. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011).
172. Friedman, supra note 168, at 56-57.
173. See supra Part III.A.
174. See infra Part IV.A.
175. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. The Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act
Should Be Limited in Order to Restrict the Use of
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts
The Supreme Court has expanded the scope of the FAA beyond
that which its drafters intended and therefore, the scope of the FAA
should be limited in order to restrict the use of mandatory arbitration in
consumer contracts.176 Generally, the use of mandatory arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts is contrary to pubic policy because
consumer contracts are typically contracts of adhesion.177 The legislative
history of the FAA indicates that the violation of public policy falls
within the actual text of the savings clause of the FAA.178
1. The Supreme Court Expanded the Scope of the Federal
Arbitration Act Beyond the Intentions of Its Drafters
The Supreme Court misinterpreted the intent of the drafters of the
FAA and consequently held mandatory arbitration clauses generally
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” in consumer contracts.179 Congress
passed the FAA was passed in order to enforce arbitration clauses in
federal courts—not state courts.180 Pursuant to a House Committee
176. See infra Part IV.A.1.
177. See supra Part III.A.
178. See infra Part IV.A.1. Although legislative intent is only persuasive legal authority, some
courts have relied upon legislative intent when “the legislative intent is so clear.” See State v. N.J.
State Trooper Captains Ass’n, 116 A.3d 63, 71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (“The Division
argues that the phrasing of the language indicates a legislative intent to impose on the executive
branch the same one-pronged test that the Act applies to superintendents and assistant
superintendents within school districts. We do not agree that the legislative intent is so clear in the
case before us.” (emphasis added)); Andersen v. Long Island R.R., 453 N.Y.S.2d 203, 208-09 (App.
Div. 1982), aff’d, 450 N.E.2d 213 (N.Y. 1993) (“Implied repeals are not favored by the courts, and
should be found only where the legislative intent is so clear, or two statutory provisions are so
mutually inconsistent, that the only possible conclusion is that an earlier enactment was in fact
repealed by a later enactment.” (emphasis added)); Oregon v. Galligan, 816 P.2d. 601, 604 (Or.
1991) (en banc) (“Because the legislative intent is so clear, and because the context of ORS 162.135
requires it, we hold that the word ‘custody,’ as used in ORS 162.135(7), includes detention in a
correctional facility.” (emphasis added)); see also Jesse M. Barrett, Note, Legislative History, the
Neutral, Dispassionate Judge, and Legislative Supremacy: Preserving the Latter Ideals Through the
Former Tool, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 819, 826-27 (1998) (discussing that legislative intent may
be particularly useful in statutory construction when the “statutory language is insufficient to
eliminate all ambiguities”).
179. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (“If the parties to the
arbitration are willing to proceed under it, they need not resort to the courts at all.”); Horton, supra
note 1, at 1225-27; supra Part III.
180. Horton, supra note 1, at 1226-27; see H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (“The bill declares
simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the
Federal courts for their enforcement.”).
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Report on the FAA, the enforceability of arbitration agreements was a
question of procedural law rather than substantive law.181 Consequently,
as a question of procedural law, the enforceability of an arbitration
provision would be determined based upon the reviewing court rather
than the forum in which the contract was made.182 As a result, the
enactment of the federal law was crucial to the ability to
enforce arbitration clauses in contracts between parties located in
different states.183
The strictly procedural nature of the FAA was also confirmed by
the simultaneous support of FAA advocates and reformers to the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(“NCCUSL”) in support of an arbitration act.184 If enacted, the
NCCUSL’s proposed arbitration act would have enabled states to create
laws that would make pre-dispute arbitration agreements enforceable in
state courts.185 Consequently, if the FAA was intended to be applicable
in state courts, the NCCUSL’s proposal would have been not only
unnecessary but also redundant.186
Moreover, comments by legislators and reform advocates during
the time period have demonstrated that the FAA was never intended to
be applied to consumer or employment contracts.187 Instead, Congress
intended that application of the FAA would be limited to agreements
between businesses with relatively equal bargaining power.188 For
181. Horton, supra note 1, at 1226-27; see H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2.
182. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (“Before [arbitration] contracts could be enforced in the
Federal courts, therefore, this law is essential. The bill declares that such agreements shall be
recognized and enforced by the courts of the United States.”); Arbitration of Interstate Commercial
Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the
Judiciary, 68th Cong. 37 (1924) (“A Federal statute providing for the enforcement of arbitration
agreement does relate solely to procedure of the Federal courts.”).
183. Burch, supra note 60, at 1313-15.
184. Id. at 1316-17.
185. Id. at 1317.
186. Id.; Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 3, at 649-50 (“The fact that the
same groups that sought passage of the FAA were working simultaneously on state laws that would
have been superfluous if the FAA were truly intended to govern the state forum as well as the
federal bolsters this conclusion.”). The idea that the FAA was originally intended to only apply to
federal courts is confirmed by the repeated references to “federal courts” in the Act. See MACNEIL,
supra note 51, at 106-07 (“Either the A.B.A. and Congress were being extraordinarily dense in
failing to recognize that those references should be to all courts, or they meant exactly what they
said when they referred only to federal courts.”).
187. See Moses, supra note 51, at 99-100 (footnotes omitted) (“Today’s statute [(FAA)]—
which has been construed to preempt state law, eliminate the requirement of consent to arbitration,
permit arbitration of statutory rights, and remove the jury trial right from citizens without their
knowledge or consent . . . .”).
188. See id. at 106.
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instance, Charles Bernheimer, Chairman of the Arbitration Committee of
the New York Chamber of Commerce, stated that the FAA was meant to
apply only to voluntary agreements with the purpose of “preserv[ing]
business friendships.”189
However, in 1984, the Supreme Court transformed the FAA into a
substantive federal law that would trump conflicting state laws in state
court.190 In Southland Corp. v. Keating,191 the Supreme Court divorced
the FAA from its legislative history—an act of judicial activism—and
rewrote the Act into a meaning of its choosing.192 The Court justified
expanding the scope of the FAA by relying upon the national policy of
favoring arbitration in order do the following: “(1) cover statutory
disputes and employment agreements, (2) preempt state consumerprotection laws, and (3) eliminate arbitration’s consent requirement.”193
Following the decision, “companies increasingly began adding
arbitration provisions to their consumer, employee, and franchisee
agreements—often using those provisions to restrict or eliminate the
nondrafting parties’ rights.”194 Despite the lack of legislative consent, the
Supreme Court instructed the lower courts to enforce arbitration clauses
“since parties should have autonomy to negotiate the manner in which
they resolve disputes.”195

189. Willy E. Rice, Courts Gone “Irrationally Biased” in Favor of the Federal Arbitration
Act?—Enforcing Arbitration Provisions in Standardized Applications and Marginalizing
Consumer-Protection, Antidiscrimination, and States’ Contract Laws: A 1925–2014 Legal and
Empirical Analysis, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 405, 447 (2015) (quoting Arbitration of Interstate
Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the
Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 7 (1924) (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman
Comm. on Arbitration, Chamber Commerce of the State of N.Y., N.Y.C.)).
190. See infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text.
191. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
192. See id. at 11-12 (“The Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce Clause power
[that] clearly implied the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal
courts. . . . [W]hen Congress exercises its authority to enact substantive federal law under the
Commerce Clause, it normally creates rules that are enforceable in state as well as federal courts.”
(citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., Co. 388 U.S. 395, 420 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting))); Moses, supra note 51, at 130-31.
193. Burch, supra note 60, at 1322.
194. Id. at 1309; see id. at 1325.
195. Id. at 1309 (emphasis added). The author of this Note acknowledges that many businesses
operating at arms-length may bilaterally consent to arbitration in order “to keep the transaction,
which is often part of a continuing relationship, running smoothly.” See Dale Beck Furnish,
Commercial Arbitration Agreements and the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 317,
318 (1979). However, there is an inherent unequal bargaining power between consumers and
commercial parties and therefore, contract law should reflect this phenomenon. See supra Part III.A.
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The Supreme Court further misinterpreted the FAA in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion when it discounted the savings clause.196
When completing its preemption analysis, the Court did not properly
consider the meaning of the savings clause within the framework of the
FAA’s statutory purpose.197 The Court found that the savings clause
could not be invoked to save a right that “would be absolutely
inconsistent with the provisions of the act.”198 Although Congress made
no explicit statement regarding the purposes of the Act within the actual
text of the FAA, the public policy exception is clearly within the plain
text of the savings clause.199 However, the Supreme Court refused to
invoke the savings clause to render an arbitration clause unenforceable
since “doing so would conflict with that statutory purpose.”200
Accordingly, the Court “[i]n effect wrote the savings clause out of the
FAA for purposes of its preemption analysis.”201
2. Functionality of Restricting Mandatory Arbitration in
Consumer Contracts
The United States already restricted mandatory arbitration clauses
in closed consumer credit transactions and should extend this policy to
mandatory arbitration clauses to all consumer contracts.202 For instance,
“[a] contract or other agreement for a consumer credit transaction
secured by a dwelling” may not be subject to pre-mandatory arbitration
clauses.203 However, consumers and lenders still remain eligible to settle
or arbitrate any dispute after the dispute arises.204
196. See 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). For a further discussion on preemption and Concepcion,
see supra Part III.C.
197. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343-45 (stating that the “principal purpose” of the FAA—readily
apparent from the text—was to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according
to their terms” (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 478 (1989))).
198. Id. (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-28 (1998)).
199. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924) (“The purpose of the [FAA] is clearly set forth in
section 2.”); Wilson, supra note 142, at 125.
200. Wilson, supra note 142, at 125.
201. Id.
202. See Consumer Fin. Servs. Grp., TILA Ban on Mandatory Arbitration in Mortgage Loans
Takes Effect June 1, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (May 16, 2013), http://www.ballardspahr.com/
alertspublications/legalalerts/2013-05-16-tila-ban-on-mandatory-arbitration-in-mortgage-loans.aspx
(explaining that the Truth in Lending Act bans mandatory arbitration clauses in certain mortgage
loans).
203. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(h) (2013); VALERIE MOSS, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE, CREDIT
UNION NAT’L ASS’N, PROHIBITION ON MANDATORY ARBITRATION & WAIVERS OF CERTAIN
CONSUMER RIGHTS 1-2 (2013), https://www.cuna.org/uploadedFiles/CUNA/Compliance/
Compliance _EGuide/Guide_Entries/CompNotes_MandatoryArbitration.pdf.
204. MOSS, supra note 203, at 2.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss1/16

30

Hollander: Overcoming the Achilles' Heel of Consumer Protection: Limiting Ma

2017]

OVERCOMING THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF CONSUMER PROTECTION

393

Moreover, other nations have demonstrated that the restriction of
mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts proves to be a
workable model.205 For example, France restricted the use of mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts between consumers and
businesses.206 The French Civil Code permits the submission of disputes
to arbitration in most commercial transactions but impliedly bars
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.207
Moreover, the French Civil Code considers arbitration clauses between
businesses and consumers to be “unfair” and detrimental to consumers
due to the “significant imbalance between the rights and obligations of
the parties to the contract.”208 Because of the inherent imbalance of
power between commercial parties and consumers, the FAA should be
interpreted by courts to exclude consumer contracts or Congress should
amend the FAA as to expressly exclude consumer contracts.209
Accordingly, states would be able to protect their residents

205. See FRANZ T. SCHWARTZ & CHRISTIAN W. KONRAD, THE VIENNA RULES: A
COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN AUSTRIA 15-16 (2009) (“Indeed, under
Section 617(5) ZPO, the arbitration agreements ‘shall be of relevance only if the consumer invokes
it’, if consumer, at the time the arbitration is concluded or when the arbitration is initiated, does not
have his domicile, habitual place of residence or place of employment in the jurisdiction where the
arbitration has its seat. . . . [T]he new arbitration law makes it practically impossible to conclude an
arbitration agreement with a consumer.” (citing ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CIVIL PROCEDURE
STATUTE]
§ 617
(5),
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&
Dokumentnummer=NOR40072303 (Austria))); Wolf Theiss & Katerina Kulhankova, Twilight of
Arbitration Clauses in Czech Consumer Credit Agreements, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 19,
2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=635930d0-32d9-472b-9249-c04339a207ef
(explaining that amendments to the Consumer Credit Act in the Czech Republic completely bar
arbitration as a mechanism of dispute resolution between credit providers and consumers, and all
consumer credit disputes must be resolved by regular courts as a result); World Heritage
Encyclopedia, Arbitration Agreement, PROJECT GUTENBERG SELF-PUBLISHING PRESS,
http://www.gutenberg.us/articles/eng/Arbitration_agreement (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (stating
that German law excludes disputes over rental of living space from any form of arbitration but
permits arbitration clauses in consumer contracts only if the arbitration clause is signed on a
separate document that bears no other information other than the arbitration agreement).
206. Amy J. Schmitz, American Exceptionalism in Consumer Arbitration, 10 LOY. U. CHI.
INT’L L. REV. 81, 95 (2012).
207. Id.
208. Id. (quoting CODE DE LA CONSOMMATION [C. CON.] [CONSUMER CODE] art. L132-1
(Fr.)).
209. Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic (“The most direct way
to address mandatory arbitration would be for Congress to amend the Federal Arbitration Act to
exempt consumer and employment arbitration, or to provide more protection for consumer and
employee rights in arbitration. Whereas state-level legislative action to this effect would almost
certainly be preempted by the FAA, legislation passed by Congress would encounter no such
problem.” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012))); supra Part III.A.
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better through state consumer protection laws without fearing
federal preemption.210
B. The Dodd-Frank Act Should Impose a
Rebuttable Presumption Against the Enforcement
of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts
Legislation should reflect the inherently unequal bargaining power
between consumers and commercial parties.211 In the United States, one
way to do this would be to simply include additional provisions to the
existing language restricting the use of mandatory arbitration clauses
in consumer contracts.212 Currently 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) provides
as follows:
(b) Further authority
The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or impose conditions or
limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a
consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for
arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau
finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations
is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers. The
findings in such rule shall be consistent with the study conducted
under subsection(a).213

It is suggested that the following provisions be added to
12 U.S.C. § 5518(b):
There is a presumption that prohibition or restriction of mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration is in the public interest and for the protection
of consumers.214 The burden of proof rests with the party seeking
210. See Stone & Colvin, supra note 209.
211. See Shelly Smith, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts:
Consumer Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191,
1245-48 (2001).
212. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
213. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b).
214. See infra note 220 and accompanying text. Opponents may argue that imposing
restrictions on mandatory arbitration in consumer contracts may adversely affect consumers. See
George Calhoun, Arbitration Under Fire: Brace Your Company for Less Contract Freedom and
More Class Actions, FTC BEAT (Mar. 31, 2016), https://ftcbeat.com/2016/03/31/arbitration-underfire-brace-your-company-for-less-contract-freedom-and-more-class-actions. Skeptics of mandatory
arbitration may argue, as follows, that limiting or restricting arbitration may be harmful for
consumers:
By interfering with Americans’ freedom of contract to prevent the use of mandatory
arbitration, the government could severely damage U.S. business interests by exposing
them to a marked increase in expensive class action litigation. In turn, that would result
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enforcement to prove that enforcing the arbitration clause would not
violate public policy.215

Other nations similarly restricted the use of mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.216 The legislation would
act in much the same way as the Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts (“Consumer Directive”) issued by the Council
of the European Union in 1993.217 Under the Consumer Directive,
terms that were not individually negotiated in consumer contracts
are considered unfair and therefore, not binding on consumers.218
Specifically, the following should be evaluated to determine whether
a term is unfair:
Unfairness looks to the requirements of good faith and whether an
arbitration clause causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights
and obligations that acts to the detriment of the consumer. Terms must
also be drafted in plain, intelligible language and consumers must have
the opportunity to examine all contract terms. 219

The Consumer Directive creates a rebuttable presumption that predispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are invalid.220 Pursuant
in more limited choices and increased costs for consumers.
Id. Moreover, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that lawyers “not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing
so that is not frivolous.” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
215. See infra note 220.
216. Donna M. Bates, Note, A Consumer’s Dream or Pandora’s Box: Is Arbitration a Viable
Option for Cross-Border Consumer Disputes?, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 823, 842-44 (2004); see,
e.g., Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive]; AUSTRIAN
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2016, at 14-16 (Christian Klausegger et al. eds.,
2016), https://www.walderwyss.com/publications/1769.pdf.
217. Council Directive, supra note 214 (“A contractual term which has not been individually
negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a
significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the
detriment of the consumer.”).
218. Bates, supra note 216, at 839-41.
219. Id. at 839-40.
220. Walter D. Kelley Jr., Mandatory Arbitration in the United States and Europe, HAUSFELD
(Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.hausfeld.com/news/eu/mandatory-arbitration-in-the-united-state-andeurope#_edn21. A rebuttable presumption may affect the burden of producing evidence or the
burden of proof. See Kopping v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 618, 623 (Ct. App.
2006). Rebuttable presumptions have been adopted in many financial contexts. See, e.g., Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230, 245-49 (1987) (holding that a rebuttable presumption of materiality
was proper when stockholders relied on information made available when buying or selling
securities); Krueger v. Ary, 205 P.3d 1150, 1154-55 (Colo. 2009) (en banc) (stating that rebuttable
presumption of undue influence and unfairness is imposed when “[a] party can show the grantee
was a fiduciary to the grantor or had a confidential relationship with the grantor”). For a discussion
on the rebuttable presumption employed in the context of “fraud on the market theory” in Basic, see

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

33

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 16

396

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:363

to the Consumer Directive, courts of member states of the European
Union must “presume that the arbitration agreement in consumer
contracts is an unfair term, if it was not individually negotiated by the
parties after the dispute arose.”221 The language of the Directive provides
that a contract term would qualify as unfair provided that the both of the
following conditions are satisfied: (1) the term creates a “significant
imbalance” in the rights and obligations of the parties to the detriment of
the consumer and (2) the imbalance created must be “contrary to the
principle[s] [of] good faith.”222 However, “the official position is that
any clause that causes a significant imbalance is by definition contrary to
the principle of good faith.”223
Since sophisticated attorneys typically draft consumer contracts,
and the arbitration clauses in these contracts are usually included without
giving effective notice to consumers, the United States should adopt a
similar rebuttable presumption to restrict and limit the use of mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clauses.224 Moreover, legislation should reflect
that consumers often do not seek legal advice before entering consumer
contracts.225 As such, a rebuttable presumption should be adopted to
restrict and limit the use of mandatory arbitration.226
V.

CONCLUSION

The use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts is contrary to public policy and should be prohibited or, at the
very least, limited.227 Despite the fact that sophisticated attorneys design
arbitration agreements without giving effective notice to consumers,
arbitration agreements involving commerce are generally held
enforceable under the FAA.228 Although Congress intended for the FAA
to target commercial parties of generally comparable bargaining power,
courts have expanded the scope of the FAA as to include consumer
Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 895,
897-98, 910-11 (2013).
221. Justinas Jarusevicius, Consumer Arbitration–Will the Two Different Worlds Across the
Ocean Converge?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
2016/02/25/consumer-arbitration-will-the-two-different-worlds-across-the-ocean-converge.
222. James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: European
Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 134-35 (2003); see Council Directive, supra note 214.
223. Maxeiner, supra note 222, at 134-35.
224. See supra Part III.A–B.
225. See supra Part III.A.
226. See supra Part IV.B.
227. See supra Parts III–IV.
228. See supra Part III.
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contracts.229 Congress has established the CFPB in order to protect
consumers.230 In addition, states have attempted to protect consumers
through consumer protection laws.231 However, the FAA often preempts
state consumer protection laws.232 As investor confidence is at the crux
of health and stability of the economy, consumers should be provided
more protection.233 Therefore, this Note proposes total prohibition of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts or
additions to the existing law to limit the use of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.234
Mindy R. Hollander*

229. See supra Parts III.C–IV.1.A.
230. See supra Part II.C.
231. See supra Part III.A.1.
232. See supra Part III.C.
233. See H.R. 1098, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); supra Parts III.B, IV.
234. See supra Part IV.
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